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 Modern conflict is rarely fought bilaterally, instead many states share the burden of war. 
Multilateralism adds legitimacy to, and potentially reduces the cost of, the mission and so the 
major powers recruit its allies to fight wars with them. Conflict is costly for all states involved. 
As a result, the decision to join the effort is not simple. The smaller allies that major powers ask 
to join in must justify the cost of that conflict. Some states always fight alongside its major allies, 
others have more variability in its commitments. This paper aims to identify the reasons why 
states, specifically secondary allies, choose to burden share in these multilateral conflicts. 
Secondary allies are the middle power states who believe they are not at the top of the major 
power's list of priorities and have less influence in the international system. These states are 
“burden-sharing” when they take on the task of paying part of the cost of conflict whether that be 
in men, money, or resources. Regardless, they still commit themselves to major power alliances 
in hopes that it will benefit them either economically or militarily. Ultimately, this analysis 
shows that when a secondary power’s government highly values the alliance with the major 
power, they will burden-share with that power unless public opinion is preventative.  
One super power Australia routinely burden-shares with the United States, but why? Why 
would Australia risk men and money on United States missions, some of which are unpopular 
but all of which are costly? Is it simply the importance of the United States alliance to the 
Australians? Are the Australian people pushing its government to get involved? Or maybe, each 
of these cases also happened to threaten Australian security. The common thread linking each 
decision to intervene will help identify the pattern as to why secondary powers, in general, 
burden share, 
 In 1962, Lyndon Johnson asked Australia to assist the unpopular United States efforts in 
Vietnam and Australia aided the mission. In 2003, Australia deployed troops to Iraq to assist the 
United States in taking down Saddam Hussein after Western powers accused him of having 
weapons of mass destruction. And now, Australia and Japan have come together to assist the US 
mission of containing Chinese military power in the Pacific: A move that could hurt Australia’s 
future economic relationship with China. Australia shared a burden with the United States in 
each of these conflicts when other close allies of Washington refused. 
The Australian–American relationship faced the test of time as the two have fought 
together in every conflict since World War I and they have remained close in peacetime. They 
are linked through economic treaties, defense agreements, and have worked together in times of 
humanitarian crisis as well. The United States has similarly close relations with Britain and 
France, but they do not always choose to contribute like Australia does. 
International Relations theorists have long studied the reasons that countries burden share 
and so there is a substantial base of information on the topic. With that said, the Australian 
commitment to US missions is different and a test of the existing theories only partially answers 
the question of why Australia burden shares. Australia is a paranoid, secondary allies meaning 
that it has different motivations behind burden-sharing than major powers. The paranoia of 
abandonment also separates out Australia from other secondary allies who may have a greater 
ability to ignore American calls to action.  
To understand Australian rationale for burden-sharing I will study the cases of Australia’s 
participation in Vietnam, Iraq, as well as current relations with China to assess burden-sharing in 
a variety of situations. The Vietnam War will shed light on the early decades of the American-
Australian relationship before there was a long history of cooperation, and when Australia still 
had other large power allies. Vietnam was an unpopular war when the United States asked 
Australia to join the United States with boots on the ground. Regardless Australia answered the 
call to arms. In Iraq, the decision was more widely debated internationally but against Australia 
came to US aid. Australia pulled out of Iraq before the end of the war and studying what caused 
the removal of troops will shed light on the necessary conditions for burden-sharing. Lastly, the 
case on modern relations in the Pacific with Australia, Japan, and China will display the use of 
soft power burden-sharing outside of conflict. The decisions that the Australian government 
made to oppose Chinese military power had its costs but is it truly risking its economic 
relationship with China? The China case to shows the rationale for burden-sharing when there is 
no kinetic conflict to get involved in and powers must act through balancing. The Australian-
American relationship is well defined by the time the issue of China emerges, so in contrast to 
the Vietnam case, it should pinpoint the impact of established relations on burden-sharing. 
Understanding the extent of the burden shared in each of these cases and the reasoning behind 
the contribution will create a holistic understanding of Australia's likeliness to contribute to an 
American cause. Therefore, it will clarify the conditions required for secondary allies to 
contribute to the major power's efforts.  
In each of these cases, Australia's assistance allowed the United States to fight for the 
international order and not just their power. The Washington cannot always depend on other 
major power allies, like France and Britain, to come to its aid as those powers make its decision 
based on different criteria. Secondary allies are necessary for the United States to maintain its 
legitimacy when it chooses to go above international organizations or fights controversial wars. 
Therefore, understanding what motivates states to burden share will keep secondary allies on the 
side of the United States. 
The analysis of the three cases strongly suggests that if the secondary ally’s government 
highly values the alliance with the major power, then it will burden share if public opinion is not 
preventative. Public opinion will not be preventative if the public either recognizes the 
importance of the alliance or perceives a threat from the adversary that it will fight. Threat can 
also influence a state to act but in the end, the alliance valuation is what defines whether burden-
sharing will take place. If the secondary ally believes it can maintain security even if the 
dominant power pulls back security commitments and cooperation with the state it will be less 
likely to burden share, because the value of that alliance has diminished. This is seen in Vietnam 
when Australia believed the United States was the major power under which to burden share and 
so it chose the more costly intervention to show commitment to the US. Increased support for the 
United States throughout the country influenced the decision to join the coalition and when the 
pro-American sentiment faded, Australia pulled itself back from the conflict pinpointing alliance 
valuation as a major contributor to its intervention. Lastly, in the case of China, the importance 
of American security proved more influential than the economic ties of China as Australia faced 
strong economic sanctions for the sake of maintaining strong ties with the United States.  
Literature Review 
 The studies of burden-sharing are numerous yet there is no agreement on one decisive 
factor that determines if a country will burden share. Most theorists conclude that the best 
assessments of burden-sharing are those that account for both the factors from the international 
system as well as the domestic political situation. The role of the domestic and external factors 
varies from theorist to theorist.  
  Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leopold, and Danny Unger were some of the first individuals to 
address the question of why states contribute to alliances. Bennett, et al. propose five potential 
hypotheses that could determine a state's contribution. Those are: for the sake of collective 
action, to balance a threat, alliance dependence, to protect state autonomy, and because that is 
what their constituents want.1  Through five case studies of various countries' decisions to enter 
the Persian Gulf War, one for each hypothesis, they concluded that a country's likelihood to 
participate was determined by the external factors from the international system such as 
collective action, balancing threat, or alliance dependence. But the way a country contributed 
was based on the domestic political situation and explained by the assessments of state autonomy 
and domestic politics.2  This case is useful to understand the possible factors of burden-sharing 
but the isolation of external from internal factors oversimplifies political structures. There is an 
intricate interconnection between the two that needs to be assessed. 
 Daniel Baltrusaitus further defines the causes of different domestic factors for burden-
sharing. He writes in Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing in the War in Iraq in 2008 when 
the war is ongoing. This assessment argues that a state's domestic political structure finds the 
contributions of states instead of the political climate. States with strong executive branches were 
likely to commit to burden-sharing and supply forces. Alternatively, states with more 
“parliamentary freedom,” or legislative power, were less likely to get involved with forces on the 
ground but may still help in some way.3 The importance of domestic politics in state's decisions 
to burden share is important but Baltrusaitus recognize the limitations of his theory as a result of 
national elections. He posits that the executive is more likely to use force; but, in democratic 
nations, the public still holds power over the executive pushing its hand in times of election.4 
Therefore, regardless of the structure, public opinion influences how the government uses force 
overall.  
 
1 Bennett, Andrew, Lepgold, Joseph, and Unger, Danny. "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War." International 
Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 40 -42.  
2 Ibid. 72.  
3 Baltrusaitus, Daniel. “Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in Iraq.” PhD diss., Georgetown 
University, 2008. 74. 
4 Ibid, 436.  
 In her 2013 work, American Allies in Times of War Stefanie Von Hlatky comes to a 
similar conclusion to Bennett et all. as she tries to understand why US allies are so unreliable in 
their burden-sharing. Her goal was to understand why some states go all out and others do not 
join US military efforts at all. For example, the special relationship between the United States 
and the United Kingdom was useless when recruiting help for the Vietnam war effort; however, 
Australia quickly came to US aid.5  She reasons that the secondary allies still are swayed by the 
fear that not contributing to a war effort will cause them to be marginalized by the unipole 
(which was America at the time of her assessment). However, the domestic impact of burden-
sharing is something those states also have to consider as the leaders are concerned with their 
political survival.6 This theory is closest to the explanation that I pose here. However, Von 
Hlatky wrote her assessment for a unipolar world and that is not the status quo, and so we must 
study how these tenets hold up in a bipolar structure.  
 Jason Davidson's work on burden-sharing, American Allies and War: Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, emphasizes the interconnected nature of those domestic and international 
influences and works to understand how they interact. His case studies on allied contributions to 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq support the conclusion that if a state values its alliance with the 
US, perceives the target as a threat, and public and opposition opinion are both in favor of 
intervention, then the US ally will assist the US.7  If any of these three conditions are not met, 
then contributions are not guaranteed; instead, the balance of these three conditions must be 
tested. The most important take away from this theory is that domestic opposition is extremely 
hard to overcome. Strong domestic opposition does not mean an ally will make a small 
 
5 Von Hlatky, Stefanie. “American Allies in Times of War.” United Kingdom. Oxford University Press (2013): 2. 
6 Ibid. 3 
7 Davidson, J. America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. New York. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.  
contribution; it usually means the ally will not contribute. Davidson's cases looked closely at 
Britain, Italy, and France. Two of these three are larger power contributors, as a result, he over-
emphasizes the necessity for the ally to recognize a threat. Large powers are not dependent on 
the United States in the same way as secondary allies. The Britain and Frances of the 
international system benefit from its alliances with the United States however, these powers have 
enough influence, economic and political, on its own to overcome abandonment from the United 
States. On the other hand, smaller powers like Australia, Poland, Japan, and South Korea lack 
such influence. This is just one of many differences that separates large powers from smaller 
powers in its rationale to burden-share. 
Furthermore, in 2016, Charles Miller at the Australian National University wrote another 
piece on burden sharing, this time specifically from the perspective of the Australian public. The 
analysis and study on public opinion in Australia concluded that neither the voters nor the 
candidates express support for a free-riding position, where they reap the benefits of agreements 
without paying their share of the cost.8 The data from this study shows that Australian trust in the 
United States makes the Australian people more willing to aid US missions. Furthermore, if it 
feels like the United States will defend them, it will be more likely to contribute.9 The public 
trust of the United States in Australia is powerful and helped Australia to take part in numerous 
US conflicts since WWI. This last study found a potentially important trait of secondary allies, 
they highly value the United States. Miller recognizes the faults of this study when he notes 
foreign policy is not always a salient issue with the public, and therefore policy makers can 
overlook public opinion. Moreover, the way politician frame foreign policy issues also have a 
 
13 Miller, Charles. "Free Riders in Spite of Themselves? Public Opinion, Elite Behavior, and Alliance Burden 
Sharing in Australia." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 28, no. 2 (2016). 209. 
9 Ibid. 213. 
massive influence on public opinion as we will be in the Vietnam case. Miller introduces the 
importance of alliance valuation by the public into the discussion on burden-sharing and I agree 
that it has an important role to play. 
Charles Miller and Patrick Mello both assessed the rationale for ending burden-sharing 
agreements and both conclude that domestic and international influences aided the decision, just 
as they play a role in the decision to burden-share. In 2010, Miller looked into why international 
support for the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan was declining and determined the loss of 
domestic faith in the coalition’s ability to succeed was the primary reason for withdrawal.10 
Changing beliefs of political leadership and the breakdown of the consensus that this was 
necessary also played a crucial role.11 Mello's research was completed on the withdrawal of allies 
from Iraq, which is something that I will directly be assessing also later in this paper. He 
concludes that leftist partisanship, and a lack of upcoming election is what led Australia, along 
with others, to withdraw before the end of the conflict.12  This rationale did not extend to every 
country Mello researched. A second group that did not leave because of political shifts, was 
swayed to leave Iraq as a consequence of large casualties and direct attacks against its soldiers, 
such as the cases of The Philippines and Bulgaria.13  
Both of these studies use Australia as an example of political power changes causing 
withdrawal. The lack of upcoming elections that pushed countries out of Iraq, according to 
Mello, was also the result of elections having just occurred in many instances. There was a 
transfer of power in Australia to a government that was much less pro-American which caused 
 
10 Miller, Charles A. “Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in 
Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany.” Letort Papers ; 
No. 38. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010. 7 
11 Ibid. 126 – 129. 
12 Mello, Patrick A. "Paths towards Coalition Defection: Democracies and Withdrawal from the Iraq War." 
European Journal of International Security 5, no. 1 (2020) 
13 Ibid.  
them to end its participation in the war effort. Besides, the increased political competition that 
Miller saw in Australia was the result of an election cycle giving the opposition a larger stage 
and reason to strongly oppose the current policy. The political changes within Australia show a 
bigger pattern as to why troops were brought home, the country's priorities toward America 
changed.  
 Each study mentioned addresses the rationale behind burden-sharing in some way, but all 
focus on groups of states and patterns within those groups. The differences between alliances are 
clearly shown between Hirofuni Shimizu and Todd Sandler's account of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and Eiko Thielemann's of the European Union. Shimizu et al. studies NATO 
relations from 2001 to 2006 and concludes that states were more likely to contribute when the 
contribution was self-preserving or beneficial to the state and in any other case could be 
considered a free rider.14 This experience may be a result of the nature of NATO. The institution 
was developed to counteract the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the USSR and the evolution of 
the Russian threat, the use of NATO as a burden-sharing mechanism became limited, therefore 
limiting the generalizability of this theory. 
 Alternatively, Thielemann’s similar assessment of the European Union and member state 
reacts to migration security issues. He came to a vastly different conclusion. The member states 
of the EU acted in solidarity as a means to protect the whole of the European Union.15 It is 
important to recognize that this burden-sharing relationship is special because all involved 
parties share borders. Therefore, when one is threatened, that threat is close to home for the rest 
of the powers too. These two opposing conclusions illustrate that different alliances have 
 
14 Shimizu, Hirofumi, and Sandler, Todd. "Recent Peacekeeping Burden Sharing." Applied Economics Letters 17, 
no. 15 (2010): 1483. 
15 Thielemann, Eiko. “Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden‐Sharing in the European Union.” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 6, no.3 (2003): 268 
different dynamics influencing the likelihood of burden-sharing. The distinctions between these 
groups emphasize the need to assess burden-sharing rationales in groups with specific attributes; 
like this study looks specifically at middle powers that are secondary allies of the United States. 
This group gives the United States a large web of influence around the world and the patterns 
recognized among them will help the United States to remain powerful.  
 Through my case studies, I will be able to contribute a specified analysis of which theory 
of burden-sharing fits the specific rationale of secondary allies.  
Theoretical Explanation 
The major takeaways from each work found in the literature review are important to 
recognize and maintain in my explanation. Davidson, Baltrusaitis, and Von Hlatky all 
acknowledged the influence of alliance valuation to some degree. I take this one step further 
when assessing only secondary allies and argue that a high alliance valuation causes states to 
burden share. Secondly, due to the increasingly democratic nature of the world, public opinion 
must not be preventative to intervention. Politicians must please their constituencies to stay in 
their positions of power. Therefore, they cannot make decisions that the public strongly disagrees 
with. To this, I simply claim that a secondary ally’s government's valuation of the alliance makes 
the ultimate decision of whether they will burden share with the major ally.  
Secondary allies are middle power countries that choose the United States as its great 
power ally. Whether it be a result of geographic distance, history, or cultural differences, these 
states still aim to prove themselves loyal to the American alliance in hopes it will pay off in its 
time of need. In the China case, the threat that Australia would need protecting from is present 
but overall, pleasing the major power ally is an insurance policy that the middle power will not 
be left alone if attacked in the future. The states that the United States has stable and long-term 
relationships with, such as the United Kingdom and France, will make decisions on burden-
sharing with a different set of criteria. They maintain a good relationship with the United States 
but do not need feel as strong a need to please the United States. This distinction allows for a 
more exact assessment of what makes secondary allies burden-share with the United States. 
Alliance valuation is the assessment of the benefit gained or lost by keeping a 
relationship with another power. Alliance valuation is high for an ally that is reliable, shows the 
ability to protect the smaller power militarily, and has the potential to help the secondary ally 
prosper in the long-term. Glenn Snyder, in his study of alliance relations, finds that states with 
similar ideological, ethnic, economic, or prestige values will naturally have a greater alliance 
valuation.16 The United States and Australia’s alliance has a strong foundation of similar values 
and therefore if Canberra is convinced Washington will come to its aid, the value of the United 
States alliance should remain high.  
Australia’s geographic distance from the United States increases its fear of abandonment 
by the United States.17 The United States can ignore an attack on Australia as it is not on the 
US's border. As a result, Australia feels the need to prove that it will come to America's aid to 
ensure the United States will come to its.18 Understanding the role of abandonment for the 
secondary ally’s is imperative to the implementation of this theory. The fear of abandonment is 
only a condition of compliance if the alliance is highly valued by the secondary ally. High 
valuation comes from the belief that the relationship with the major power will benefit from the 
smaller state complying and the faith that the major power can protect the secondary ally.  
 
16 Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 464.  
17 O'Connor, Brendon, and Vucetic, Srdjan. "Another Mars-Venus Divide? Why Australia Said 'yes' and Canada 
Said 'non' to Involvement in the 2003 Iraq War." Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 
(2010): 528. 
18 Ibid.  
Regardless of whether the dominant power protected them in the past, if the subordinate does not 
believe that the dominant power upkept its influence, or has already abandoned the smaller 
power, it will not fear the repercussions of not siding with them. 
Snyder’s theory of alliances states that alliances are created by states to ensure it is on the 
more powerful side in conflict and to avoid isolation if other states ally with one another.19 The 
side one chooses to align with is a result of similar general interests, such as defending or 
fighting for a common cause, and similar particular interests, such as identity, economics, or 
ethnicity. 20 These principles explain why the Australian-American relationship took root. 
Further, once an alliance exists the members repeatedly chose to comply or defect in Snyder’s 
theory.21 Snyder then builds off this by arguing that the higher the alliance valuation and the 
more dependent a state is on its ally the more willing it will be to entrap themselves in the 
missions of allies to prevent abandonment.22 This is exactly what we see in Australia throughout 
each case study, the fear of abandonment intensifies the role of alliance valuation for secondary 
allies.  
The responsibility to intervene is that of the subordinate, or secondary ally. Bjorn Jerdén 
deciphers the role of choice and finds that the secondary allies of major powers recognize its 
great power as the "best choice for maintaining regional stability."23 Jerdén ultimately resolves 
that secondary allies fight in conflict with the United States, or other major power, because that 
ally is highly valuable to its security. Secondary allies will burden share under the superior 
 
19 Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 462.  
20 Ibid. 464.  
21 Ibid. 466. 
22 Ibid. 471. 
23 Jerdén, Björn. "Security Expertise and International Hierarchy: The Case of ‘The Asia-Pacific Epistemic 
Community’." Review of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2017): 495.  
power that is of highest value to them, for whatever reason that may be, economically or 
militarily.  
Secondly, the role of threat is periphery in the cases that I will evaluate. Almost all theory 
recognizes a state’s primary goal is to survive. The existence of threat put that survival into 
question. Therefore, when a state perceives a threat, it is likely to react. I argue that alliance 
valuation decides how allies will react to threat. Alliance valuation is the determining factor is 
whether burden sharing will occur. Burden-sharing and threat often overlap, as allies typically 
have common enemies; in some cases, burden-sharing can exist without threat, as we will see in 
the case of Iraq. When threat is present, alliance valuation is more important of a determinate 
when despite being the more costly choice the secondary allies still sides with its major power 
instead of an alternative.  
In term of public opinion, according to Andrew Moravcsik, within liberal society the 
domestic actors that decide the actions of the state promote its interests.24 On the elite levels, this 
means that a dictator, or president, will make foreign policy decisions to help himself. In 
democratic societies, constituents hold these leaders accountable and therefore they must pay 
attention to the wishes of their constituents or those constituents will be vote them out of office. 
This is the structure that exists in all democracy and so regardless of whether burden-sharing is 
the best choice or not, a political leader’s constituents must believe it is the best choice.  
 A government that highly values its United States alliance will decide to burden share 
with the United States. However, a public that does not agree with the decision of said 
government can remove that government from power. Moravcsik makes a note in his recount of 
liberalism he emphasizes political competition within states ensures that powers listen to the sect 
 
24 Moravcsik, Andrew. “Liberalism and International Relations Theory.” Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University. No. 92-6. 1992. 6. 
of individuals it represents to some degree.25 The public must recognize a reason to burden-share 
with the United States, either because it recognizes a threat to its country or because it 
understands the importance of pleasing its American ally. As the cases will demonstrate, the 
result of the loss of public support changes the ability for the government to burden-share with 
the United States .  
  In summary, when a state's government highly values its alliance with a major power 
that state will burden share with the United States if public opinion is not preventative. Public 
opinion will only be preventative if the public does not recognize the importance of supporting 
good relations with the United States and they do not perceive a threat from the power it would 
be facing. If the public senses either condition, the country will fight alongside the United States.  
 
The Alternative Theoretical Explanation 
  If this theory falls short of describing the patterns of secondary allies there are other 
possible rationales including one where the secondary ally may not be fighting to maintain its 
security protections from the US; but its protections from the world order that it identify with, 
and from which they benefit. Wars over ideology are common. A simplified view of the Cold 
War and the war on terrorism emphasize this. When capitalism was threatened, capitalist nations 
sided against the communists to fight for the liberal world order from which they benefitted. 
Then again, when terrorist groups attacked the twin towers, the liberal lifestyle was threatened, 
and countries came together to fight.  
 When these conflicts are assessed in terms of the motives for each conflict it is rational to 
conclude that the allies that fought alongside Washington were fighting for its right to maintain 
 
25 Ibid, 9-10.  
its identity. The constructivist theory emphasizes the role that identity plays in a state's 
international affairs, defense of that identity can drive a state to war. This perspective reframes 
the influence of the alliance on the choice to intervene and argues that Australia, or any other 
secondary ally, aids the United States by the coincidence of protecting the same cultural, 
political, and economic values. In Matt McDonald’s breakdown of constructivist theory, he 
defines security as a social construction. States create the structures that decide which group 
needs to be protected and how one should protect it. 26 Then the role of a state's identity can be a 
powerful force in deciding whether or not a state should go to war. Arnold Wolfers simplifies 
this definition of security noting that it is the protection of a state's core values.27 If a secondary 
state recognizes the international system that is identify with is under attack, then it is likely to 
fight to protect it. It will defend its core values.  
For Australia, those values often align with the United States, and therefore it burden-
shares with them for mutual benefit. The United States created its identity as a protective world 
power, and it helped to build institutions to enforce a liberal international order. As defined by 
Ikenberry, the liberal international order is, “co-binding security institutions, penetrated 
American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, economic openness, and civic identity.”28 
The interaction of these elements creates the primarily democratic liberal international order that 
Washington protects and developed the ‘free world’ identity that people often equated to it.29 For 
the sake of this paper the free world identity, civic identity, and cooperation’s with institutions 
are of primary importance.  
 
26 McDonald, Matthew. “Constructivisms” in Security Studies : An Introduction. 3rd ed. Edited by Paul D Williams 
and Matthew McDonald, 48-58. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2018. 49.  
27 Ibid, 50.  
28 Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order." Review of 
International Studies 25, no. 2 (1999): 195. 
 
29 Ibid.  
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall note that these institutions the United States 
created allow for global governance to be the overarching power, even if set up by a major 
power.30 In more concrete terms, even though the United States helped to build the United 
Nations, the norms that the UN helps to uphold should withstand the United States testing them. 
Institutions should be looked at as insurance policies for the norms that fuel the international 
system according to constructivism.31  
 So, if this alternative is the reality of the situation, then Australian actions leading up to 
conflict will side with the United States when both countries choose to fight for the international 
systems and norms from which they benefit. Also, Australia would be more hesitant without the 
approval of international institutions, such as the UN, if at all willing to fight, without its 
approval. Instead, if they chose to ignore the reactions of the institutions, then the state’s 
intentions are not purely to protect the world order that. In general, the official statements on 
each conflict will shed light on whether the Australian identity is the reason they are fighting.  
 Through the analysis of Australian involvement in Vietnam, Iraq, and China we can see 
Australia is investing in protecting something associated with the United States whether that be 
the strength of the US’s alliance or their shared ideals and international norms. An assessment of 
government speeches and actions, and public opinion will illustrate whether that is the 
characteristics of their common identities or their security relationship with the United States. If 
the government repeatedly discusses the role that America plays in conflict and the aid that the 
United States can give Australia, it will be clear that it is their relationship that pulls Australia to 
 
30 Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. “Power in International Politics.” International Organization 59, no. 1 
(2005): 58. 
31 Navari, Cornelia. “Liberalisms.” in Security Studies : An Introduction. 3rd ed. Edited by Paul d Williams and 
Matthew McDonald, 34-47. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2018. 36.   
burden share. On the other hand, if the conversation focuses on the international system, and 
protecting the normative status quo my theory will be disproven.  
 
Case 1: Australia in Vietnam 
World War Two ended in the Pacific in 1945, but the spread of communism toward 
Australia in the Pacific followed it. The British and Americans involved themselves in the region 
in efforts to contain communism in Malay, Borneo, and Korea. Soon the conversation would turn 
to the situation in Vietnam as the French refused to pull out troops in fear that the country could 
succumb to communist rule.32 The British were tied up in Malay when the conflict began, and 
although US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, was in favor of boot on the ground assistance for the 
French but was warned that the United States could not go it alone.  
 American policymakers quickly scrambled to find allies that would fight alongside the 
United States in Vietnam and to make it a multilateral effort. The Australian government, who 
was trying to improve its relationship with the United States, were quick to please. When asked 
in 1962, the Australians deployed 30 advisors to the American efforts, and then this group grew 
when called on again in 1963.33 It was not until 1964 when the Americans would push for 
Australian to deploy infantry battalions and Australia would be deployed in June of 1965. From 
1962 until the final removal of troops 60,000 Australian troops would take part in the war effort 
and Canberra would spend $218 million.34 The decision to join the United States in Vietnam 
marked Canberra’s turn away from Britain as Australia’s number one ally.  
 
32 Lee, David. "The Liberals and Vietnam." The Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 3 (2005): 430 . 
33 Bloomfield, Alan, and Nossal, Kim Richard. “End of an Era? Anti-Americanism in the Australian Labor Party.” 
The Australian Journal of Politics and History 56, no.4 (2010):597.  
34  Ekins, Ashley. "Impressions: Australians in Vietnam. Overview of Australian military involvement in the 
Vietnam War, 1962–1975". Australian War Memorial. Accessed 29 April 2021. 
https://www.awm.gov.au/visit/exhibitions/impressions/impressions  
 The United States and Britain aimed to intervene in Vietnam, and both were Australian 
allies giving the Australians a choice of who to side with. The British addressed the issue of 
Vietnam via diplomatic means because it did not have the resources to go to war in another 
country. If Australia teamed up with the British instead, the cost of the endeavor, in terms of both 
men and money, would have been much lower. This is the course of action that the Australian 
public was hoping for.35 The decision to fight alongside the Washington came from Robert 
Menzies, Australian Prime Minister, and the Australian Labor Party coalition. Why did the 
Australian government ultimately choose the costlier option? Because the Americans also chose 
the more costly option and asked for its help at a time when Australia was trying to prove its 
commitment to the United States.  
 
Theoretical Explanation:  
The Australian military fought in the Vietnam war because its government and Australian 
people highly valued its burgeoning alliance with the United States and because the Australian 
people were convinced communism was a threat to its national security. Firstly, the Australians 
explicitly identified US alliance as a reason for going to war in Vietnam, as its relationship was 
becoming a pillar of Australian foreign policy. According to Gordon Greenwood, Australia 
developed behind a wall of British protection in the Pacific and initially thought that Australia 
would be safe if the British remained a strong naval power Australia would be safe.36 However, 
in 1941 the Australians’ biggest fear became a reality. As it faced a serious threat of invasion 
from the Japanese the British turned its attention to Nazi Germany, a threat that was much closer 
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to home. The Australians were alone.37 In the face of perceived abandonment, it the needed a 
new major power ally to bolster Australia’s defenses.  
In Australia Britain had created a Western country in the Pacific, so when Australia 
needed new allies ,it understood its Asian neighbors were not the best options. Then in 1949 
Robert Menzies was elected Prime Minister, after he ran on a platform that argued its main goals 
should be to grow independent of the UN and more supportive of its British and American 
alliances.38 The resulting foreign policy was dubbed the Triangular Policy.39 This policy 
determined that Australian security could only be achieved by maintaining strong relationships 
with Britain, the United States, and non-communist Asian nations. The linkages with the British 
and non-communist nations were already strong and so most available resources would be 
allocated to the development of a relationship with the United States. In 1951, Australia 
formalized its relationship with the United States for the first time through the signing of the 
ANZUS Treaty alongside New Zealand. As the threat of communism came closer to home, 
Menzies’ administration also developed the “forward defense” method which justified them 
fighting with the British in Borneo and Malay.40 More specifically this policy pushed Australia 
to fight beside the allies it wanted to preserve against communism to keep the threat far from the 
Australian border. This meant fighting alongside the United States.41 
The Triangular Policy and forward defense continued to take form in Australian foreign 
policy in the 1950s as Greenwood recounts, “every major postwar statement in Australia has 
stressed the importance of friendship with the United States.”42 The process of becoming a US 
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ally that received the security benefits of America would not be easy. The situation in Vietnam 
tested Canberra’s new alliance with Washington, and to prevent abandonment the Australians 
needed to prove its loyalty to the United States. In a statement from the Australian Ambassador 
to Washington, they advised, “The problem of Vietnam is one, it seems, where we could … pick 
up a lot of credit with the United States…”43 And the Menzies government wanted to jump at 
this opportunity to win the favor of the United States.  
 Also, in 1954, just after France’s defeat in Vietnam by signing the Geneva Conventions, 
there were warnings the United States would reducing its presence in the region if allies were not 
going to come to its aid.44 As a result, Australia enthusiastically increased its commitments to the 
United States in helping to form the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO).45 
Following this pattern, when the US government warned that intervention in Vietnam would be 
impossible without allies through its More Flags campaign, Australia quickly committed what it 
could to the effort.46 This was initially just advisors and non-combatants, but in 1962 the United 
States would request Australian troops on the ground. Garry Woodard wrote extensively on the 
topic of Australia in the Vietnam war. He accredits this Australia’s excitable commitment to 
Vietnam as a representation of its understanding of an “insurance premium.”47 Menzies knew 
Australia could not expect America to continue to work with Australia if it did not do the same in 
American times of need and was ready to pay for its partnership. This is Australia’s fear of 
abandonment dictating what costs the Australians were willing to pay.  
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 This defensive policy was necessary being the spread of communism threatened the 
Australian was of life and put the stability of the region into question. The presence of threat 
pushes Australia into action, the value of the alliance would decide how it would address the 
threat. Leading up to the deployment of troops on the ground, Canberra was aiming to maintain 
its relationship with both London and build one with the Washington, but the powers chose 
different approaches to the issue. Britain made a stronger diplomatic effort to create peace as it 
could not afford to send more troops, while the United States wanted boots on the ground to 
influence the situation.48 Australia’s goal to improve the American alliance pushed them toward 
the US method of involvement; but Britain also made itself a less appealing ally to Australia. 
The Australian government recognized the threat of communism. That is why the triangular 
policy that was developed, and Menzies ‘forward defense” were so widely accepted. However, 
Britain was making moves toward granting Singapore its independence. This threatened 
Australia as it presumed the predominantly Chinese population would convert Singapore to a 
communist nation and create another adversary of Australia in the region.49 Menzies’ concern 
with this decision pushed him and his administration to increase the relative importance to the 
American alliance50 as the British did not appreciate the gratitude of the situation like America 
and Australia. The Australian government decided to fight in Vietnam to improve its relationship 
with the United States. This pushed Australia to choose the United States as its major power to 
burden share with. 
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 Australia’s decided to side with the United States instead of the British by May 1962, 
when Australia committed to advisors to South Vietnam at America’s request.51 The Australian 
cabinet made this decision based on hypothetical situations where Washington may ask for 
assistance in meetings between 1959 and 1961. On three separate occasions, the executive 
determined that while they preferred to work with all its SEATO allies, the situation in Vietnam 
was important enough to address with just the United States.52 On this topic, Menzies told the 
Sydney Morning Herald that Australia’s decision was not the one the people wanted but they had 
to accept the decisions shaped by its “great and powerful friends.”53 The friend was the United 
States and it was asking for support in its endeavors in Vietnam. As a result, Australia fulfilled 
its request and sent troops to Vietnam.  
 It is not enough for the government to value the US alliance and therefore go to war. 
Public opinion must also either recognize the importance of a strong relationship with the United 
States too or see the conflict as an issue of national security. In this case, the public understood 
the gratitude of the threat of the expansion of communism and feared the realization of the 
domino theory. This was ensured by Minister of External Affairs Percy Spender in the early 
1950s and he repeatedly warned the public of the encroaching threat of Communism on 
Australia. He warned, "Should the forces of Communism prevail, and Vietnam come under the 
heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with 
Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further Communist 
activities."54 At first, legislatures and the people did not support this opinion but it steadily 
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gained support throughout Menzies' cabinet and gained popularity.55  With a constituency that 
understood the threat of communism, Menzies’ work to sway the people in favor of war would 
be easier.   
The condition that the public highly valued the American alliance when burden-sharing 
began may also be satisfied but it is almost impossible to prove because of the lack of available 
data from before the war. Regardless, Australian support for the war did not plummet when anti-
American sentiment began to spread. Public support for Vietnam was high at the beginning of 
the conflict with 61% of the public approving of the initial deployment of advisors to Vietnam 
and Thailand.56 Public support for the war remained about 50%  until April of 1969; however, by 
April of 1970 only 10% of the public wanted the Australian troops to stay in Vietnam until the 
end.57 This dramatic drop mimics the rise in anti-American sentiment through the Australian 
Labor Party and the country that would be accelerated by the Tet Offensive in 1968, and later by 
the publication of the details of the My Lai Massacre over the year.58 These atrocities, combined 
with the set-in of war fatigue, caused the people to view the Vietnam  War as an American war 
that they did not need to fight which effectively eliminated public support for the war.59 
Although impression spread rapidly through public discourse, the Australia people still supported 
the war until the government removed troops in 1973.  
The removal of troops before the drop in public support exemplifies the importance of the 
precondition of the government valuing America because in 1969 when public opinion was still 
high (50%) the government decided to recall troops from Vietnam. The Australian government 
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no longer saw this commitment to the US effort as vital to sustaining a beneficial US relationship 
and the ALP moved away from its pro-America stance. In conclusion, the decision that Australia 
made to support the US efforts in Vietnam was based on the importance of the support to the 
Americans and the opportunity to strengthen its American alliance. This was only made possible 
by the Australian people recognizing the threat of the spread of communism from the north.  
 
Alternative Explanation: 
  It could be argued that Australia was not advising and fighting in Vietnam for the sake of 
strengthening its US alliance but instead because it was a beneficiary of the liberal system that 
the United States was trying to protect in Vietnam. As previously established the identities of the 
Australian people are closely tied to those of the British people and the western world. 
Therefore, when the liberal political system they identified with was under attack, it fought to 
protect it.  
Statements by Menzies pushed the idea that fighting against communism was fighting for 
the Australian freedoms that the people took for granted. In his address at the Australian – 
American Association’s 25th-anniversary dinner in October 1965, Menzies applauded US 
acceptance of its great power role in the Post WWII world and went on to say, "the defense of 
freedom which, in the long run, make no mistake, is our own defense.” This speech recognizes 
that Australia’s efforts to fight with the United States were efforts to protect the freedom of the 
people of the world, as that was the best way to protect its “freedom”, or liberal political 
system.60 In that same speech, he would further emphasize this point by stating, "… the freedom 
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of man is not a local prerequisite, and it can't be defended in isolation."61 His conviction furthers 
the conclusion that Canberra could have been fighting for the continuation of the liberal world 
order.  
Additionally, Australia was not only fighting communism alongside the United States. 
They fought with the United Kingdom against the expansion of communism in Borneo and 
Malay too.62 This is evidence that Australia was fighting to protect the world from communism. 
Communism was as a big threat to Australia. The fight in Vietnam against communism was dual 
purposed. It was for Australia's security and to maintain alliances that were helping to protect 
them from that threat. Australia's handling of the threat of communism on two different fronts 
shows where its priorities lie. Australia had been a long-term ally of the British and was loyal to 
its commitments thereby supporting the efforts in Borneo and Malaya. However, in December 
1963, the British requested Australian troops for the first time and Australia denied its request.63 
On the other hand, within a year Australia agreed to send troops to Vietnam to support the 
United States in a conflict that was much newer. Australia eventually got involved on both fronts 
but its demonstration that the American effort was more important indicated that communism 
was not the only reason they were going to war.  
In conclusion, there is evidence to support this alternative where Australia took on its 
share of the burden simply to ensure that it would be able to continue to benefit from the liberal 
system. However, there are large holes in this argument, Australia was not involved 
diplomatically or militarily in every conflict against communism just those where its allies were. 
Also, there is no justification in this explanation for why Australia chose to fight alongside the 
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United States in Vietnam instead of remaining a dutiful follower of Britain’s lead. Both were 
fighting for that liberal identity; however, Australia saw the United States as the ally to which it 
most needed to show support. In conclusion, Australia went to war in Vietnam because of how 
important the United States was to it; not because of how important the liberal world was.  
 
Case 2: Australia in Iraq 
After Vietnam, Australia and the United States maintained its new relationship, even as 
pro-American sentiment ebbed and flowed. In 2002, the conversation about a potential war in 
Iraq began to gain momentum. Intelligence to suggested that the Iraqi government was 
stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence on the matter was inconclusive and 
each country had a different opinion on the reality of the situation in Iraq. As a result, 
international powers debates whether it should come to the US's aid. Long-term allies such as 
France decided against assistance, where Britain and smaller powers such as Poland and 
Australia chose to help out. This was a much more controversial decision and the international 
implications for joining the fight were greater than those for staying home as both the UN and 
NATO opposed the mission. On March 20th, 2003, the US, assisted by the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Poland, invaded Iraq. At the peak of conflict Australia contributed 900 troops, and 
over the course of the war they would spend $1.7 billion on the war effort.64 Why did Australia, 
a geographically removed, smaller power answer America’s call to action when so many others 
ignored it? The unpredictability of the decision makes this case especially telling of how 
important the US alliance is to Australia. 
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Theoretical Explanation: 
 Many theorists studied the rationale behind Australia's decision to join in the Iraq war 
since the decision was made partly because other US allies comparable to Australia in many 
ways almost all choose the alternative. For example, Canada and Australia are incredibly similar 
in terms of size, history, culture, economy, and quality of life and Canada chose to stay home.65 
In the end, the increased value that the American alliance, and it’s fear of being abandoned, 
pushed Australia into the war. Strengthening the alliance with Washington was a primary goal of 
Prime Minister John Howard’s administration when they made the decision to join the US-led 
coalition.66 There was an increased American appreciation for Australia after Australia provided 
aid to the US-led operations in Vietnam67 in the 1960s; and the government knew coming to the 
aid of the United States could help the alliance again. When Australia joined the coalition, 
theoretically, they decreased the chances of US abandonment. Consequently, Howard understood 
the importance and standing beside the United States in Iraq. 
The influence of the alliance is clear in PM Howard's addresses to the nation where he 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of assisting the United States as well. On March 13th, 
2003, he reminded the Australian people, "…that no nation is more important to our long-term 
security than that of the United States."68 Later that week, after the invasion began, he furthered 
that justified the decision by arguing the US alliance would only grow more important.69 In both 
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instances, Howard justifies the decision to join the efforts in Iraq as a fight against more than 
terrorism. The importance of remaining in the good graces of the Americas was a major factor 
that led Australia into the conflict.   
Moreover, there was concern that the United States would not emerge from Iraq with 
success and the international system would question the benefits of US power and therefore the 
status of its alliance would be affected.70 The concerns about the impact of this conflict on US 
power, translate into concerns of abandonment. If failed involvement tarnished the US’, then the 
security guarantees that Australia benefits from in the alliance would also diminish. The severe 
devaluation of US security guarantees leaves Australia defenseless against future threats. 
Australian decision-makers understood the important role of American power in the protection of 
Australia and the increased risks if the United States was seen as vulnerable. The Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute agreed with this sentiment as they wrote the reason success was 
important to Australia included the future “confidence of our major ally.”71 Its cooperation 
increased the legitimacy of the coalition entering Iraq, increasing the likelihood that the United 
States would walk away still powerful even if they lost as typically multilateral action is more 
supported. Australian strategists highly valued the US alliance under its current conditions, with 
the United States as a hegemon. So, its cooperation in Iraq was also a fight to maintain that 
highly valuable alliance.  
The nature of Australian involvement demonstrates that Australia was in Iraq to support 
the United States. First, in a report composed by the directorate of Army Research and Analysis 
in Australia, there is an outline of the five strategic objectives for Australian defense forces 
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which include, “demonstrate support for Australia’s alliance with the United States.”72  The 
United States and Australia’s operations were deeply intertwined to the point that ballistic and 
electronic protection kits were removed from American aircraft and offered to ADF.73  The close 
relationship between the United States and Australian military displays Australia’s dependence 
on US military support and why this alliance is important to maintain.  
The push to emphasize the potential security threat attempted to create enough public 
support for the conflict that Howard would not lose his legitimacy. PM Howard said himself, “if 
terrorists ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction that will, in [his] very passionate 
belief and argument, constitute a direct, undeniable, and lethal threat to Australia and its 
people.”74 This rhetoric of a major WMD threat mimicked the United States and British stance. 
However, various intelligence organizations around the world perceived the threat differently. 
France had concluded there was no real threat because while Iraq may have WMDs, there was 
insufficient evidence to suggest they would be used or passed off the terrorist organizations.75 On 
the other hand the UK and the United States spoke as if they had irrefutable evidence that there 
was no bigger threat to the world. Furthermore, two of the Five Eyes, Canada and New Zealand 
chose not to join the war effort in Iraq despite having access to the same intelligence. Australia 
chose to fully support the US’s interpretation and response to the intelligence when there were 
other options that were less costly.76 The difference between Australia and New Zealand or 
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Canada that made them side with the United States and UK, is that Australia has a greater fear of 
abandonment than Canada and a great military dependence on the United States than New 
Zealand both of which increase the alliance valuation for Australia. Therefore, the Australians 
had more to lose by ignoring the American interpretation of the intelligence. Australia’s 
relationship with the United States pushed them into war.  
It is important to note that the threat to Australian national security may have influenced 
the decision to enter the conflict. The concern that terrorist organizations may gain access to 
these dangerous weapons was concerning. However, it was a threat to the entire Western world, 
many of whom only supported the conflict with monetary aid. Even more so, the existence of a 
threat calls a state to action, but the high alliance valuation of the United States for Australia 
influenced how they reacted to the threat. In this case it pushed them to address the threat 
alongside the United States to strengthen the alliance.  
 In a poll conducted in January 2003, 61% of the Australian public opposed US-Australian 
military action in Iraq.77 However, as the conversation continued over the next months, and 
Howard repeatedly spoke on the topic, about the importance of the US, and the existence of a 
threat public opinion slightly shifted. In early March, 42-48.5% disapproved of Australian 
involvement in Iraq a 20-point drop in disapproval in less than three months.78 The Australian 
public also valued its American counterpart and rallied behind them. After the conflict began, 
still in March, only 38% of the Australian population opposed the war in Iraq.79 Howard 
understood the importance of going to war alongside the American military and so when the 
people initially disapproved of the conflict, he fully committed resources to change their minds.  
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An explanation for withdrawal:  
 Australian military involvement in Iraq ended before the war ended. They were not alone, 
other countries also pulled out as it became clear that the weapons that caused the invasion did 
not exist. In June of 2008, Australia was pulling troops out of Iraq because of a change in 
valuation of the US alliance by the public. They were not ending involvement in the region 
because support for the American alliance was still present, but it was not as strong. As the 
theory argues, the higher the alliance valuation the more willing a state is to be entrapped. The 
people vocalizing their opinions on ending the war in Iraq, but they still valued their alliance 
with the United States, a Lowy Institute Poll shows that while support for the US alliance 
dramatically dropped in 2007 and 2008 the Australians that valued the US alliance were still in 
the majority.80   
The election of a new leader also without the dedication to the American alliance also 
signaled a change in positioning in Iraq.81 Security wise, the Australians still wanted peace and 
stability in Iraq and the Middle East82; however, the people began to support the Australian 
Labor Party’s belief that such a change would come from within Iraq and not from Australian 
soldiers.83 Canberra also wanted to ensure the alliance with the United States was maintained but 
was not as dedicated to increasing the alliance as the previous administration. This is seen 
through its concerned with the appearance of ending involvement.84 Its concern with the 
American perception of its removal is especially evident.  
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The Australian Labor Party won the election after the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
ran on the promise of bringing Australia home. And he followed through on that promise.85 
Coming through on that promise took almost a year under Rudd's leadership. More so, the day 
that Australia began withdrawing troops, PM Rudd promised that Australia was not abandoning 
the US-led effort and would return in the form of reconstruction forces, which they did.86  In the 
US, troop reduction efforts were in full effect and George Bush's replacement in 2008 would be 
more focused on ending the conflict in Iraq. This gave Rudd the leeway to reshape the Australian 
commitment into an uninvolved force without losing the goodwill of its American ally.87 So 
while Australia did pull out before the United States, the move still followed the lead of the US. 
This is important because Australia was not no longer willing to burden share, instead they 
wanted a lesser commitment.  
While Rudd never makes a statement to this effect, if the Iraq coalition was no longer of 
concern to the Australian people, then the country would remove itself from Iraq immediately as 
any involvement was against the wishes of NATO or the UN. It is also important to note that 
Australia sustained a contingency in Afghanistan after pulling out, continuing to support the US's 
efforts in the Middle East.  
 The Australian government highly valued their alliance with the United States, and the 
public understood both the threat to national security as well as the desire to help the US. So, 
Australia assisted its American ally's mission in Iraq. When the decision to join the war had to be 
made, PM Howard desired to continue the tradition of strong Australian-American relations 
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despite the cost to the Australian people. Once Australia decided this, the Australian people 
continued to support Howard, as they too had elected him under the guise that he would 
revitalize the US alliance which could only be done through intervention.88 Then, as the war 
continues, the public maintained its desire to assist the United States even though it did not 
support the conflict. They voted out the Howard government and replaced him with Rudd who 
ran on the platform of ending violence in Iraq. It took Rudd one year to begin withdrawing 
troops in 2008. Within that year it became evident that the US administration was changing its 
tactics in Iraq, as a result of the upcoming change in administration, and so could Australia. 
Throughout the conflict, Australia continued to support its American allies. Even though the 
public no longer recognized a national security threat from Iraq, they supported its connection to 
the US. The war changed because of the lack of threat but because the second condition was still 
satisfied Australia did not have to completely pull out. Australia supported a presence in the 
region and returned to Iraq to help with reconstruction, an effort that still helped the United 
States achieve its strategic goals.  
 
Alternative Explanation:  
 Australia’s intervention may have been an effort to protect the liberal world order that 
they benefit from, and an attempt for them to protect its core values and identity. The situation in 
Iraq risked increased in stability in the world, which is concerning. Also, when coupled with the 
potential to sell weapons to terrorists, it exposed a concern that terrorist potential to attack 
western ideologies would only grow. When pitching the war to the Australian people, Howard 
assured the people, “[Australian] troops are going to defend what this society believes to be 
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right.”89 Howard strategically pushed the Australian people to support intervention through 
appealing to the Australian identity of wanting to be a benevolent power and calling on the 
emotions of his people and justifying conflict through the protection of freedoms. 
 The Australian conversation on the intervention in Iraq undeniably included a 
conversation about its allies. Howard used the similar histories of the United States and Britain to 
foster us – versus – them mentality amongst the Australia people.90 He wanted their common 
values to bring them together against Iraq and other non-Western countries.91 Its alliance with 
the United States was important, but it was important because of its shared values and not the 
security guarantees that the United States granted Australia according to this representation of 
the relationship.  
Additionally, there was the rationalization that this war was to protect the reputation of 
the United Nations, regardless of whether the UN approved. First Bush and then Howard, 
pointed out that Iraq had ignored the requests by the UN for inspection and disarmament and this 
was a "challenge to the efficacy of the UN."92  Their efforts were an effort to prevent the UN 
from being seen in the same light as its predecessor, the League of Nations. However, the 
invasion of Iraq was also a challenge to the efficacy of the UN as it took place without UN 
Security Council authorization breaking international law. Therefore, it appears this rhetoric was 
simply another way for Howard to gain the support of the Australian people. 
The role that identity had to play in the decision that Australia made to join the US 
coalition does appear to be limited. While Howard made obvious efforts to appeal to identity 
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politics, his conservative party won elections because they were, “over all that identity stuff.”93 
So, either the party’s portrayal of identity was performative, or Howard’s appeal to identity was. 
The Labor government in power before Howard often pointed to the importance of Australia’s 
role as a “good international citizen.”94 Matthew McDonald and Matthew Merefield’s 2010 
assessment of his rhetoric proposes that it was a display to gain public support for a war effort so 
that it would be possible.95 Howard said what he needed to so public opinion would not be 
preventative. Retrospective analysis of the Australian decision demonstrates the impact of the 
US alliance on the decision to intervene.  
 
 
Case 3: Australian Balancing Against China 
 As the previous cases established, Australian security is deeply intertwined with its 
American ally. However, in recent years Australian economic stability grew increasingly 
dependent on the export of energy to Chinese. In 2007, Chinese had already invested over $100 
billion in uranium and natural gas contracts making them a critical part of the Australian energy 
sector and its influence has only grown.96 Despite the increase of Chinese economic influence in 
Australia, Australia does not consider China an ally by any means. Australia participated in 
balancing efforts against the growing power of China throughout for more than 15 years. This 
includes the establishment of US military bases in Australia’s northern territory to face the 
threat. 
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 In reaction to the expansion of Chinese power, Australia remains faithful to the United 
States, however, the degree to which an administration has sided with the United States has 
varied. Initially, in 2003, that Australian strategy in US-Chinese affairs was to treat the two as 
equally as possible.97 This went as far as Australia remaining neutral on issues such as Taiwan.98  
The policy shifted in 2009 when then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd began emphasizing 
the threat of Chinese expansion and its potential detriment to Australia.99 Then in 2013, the next 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard walked back Rudd’s warning and repositioned Australia as 
relatively unaligned on the issue.100  And in 2018, another Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull 
spoke at the University of New South Wales noting that “the security and peace of the region has 
been underpinned by the United States” but goes on to remark, “Just as it is a mistake to assume 
that China will assume, vis a vis the United States, the role of the Soviet Union in the Cold War 
or for that matter, that the United States and its allies would or should seek to contain China.”101  
This statement positioned Australia comfortably between the two powers. It recognized the 
importance of the United States for regional stability while attempting to calm Chinese paranoia 
that America's presence will be inherently threatening.  
Australia was in the middle of a battle for power with its position between the United 
States and China. It was not always clear that the Australian efforts would help the United States 
maintain balance instead of aiding the Chinese effort to throw off the balance. Jaebeom Kwon 
notes that politicians and academics discussed whether siding with the Americans was the right 
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choice.102 They warned Australia against increasing its dependence on the United States because 
of the increasing unreliability of American guarantees under the Trump presidency.103  
In the last two years, the country aggressively moved to balance with the United States 
and other concerned allies in the region, despite potentially hurting its relationship with China. 
The establishment of the Darwin base in Northern Australia is one example of Australia's 
military burden-sharing.104 When the Minister of Defence Maurice Payne defended this project 
in 2016 she argued it was need because it is, “consistent with Australia’s longstanding strategic 
interests in supporting US engagement in our region in a manner that promotes regional security 
and stability.”105 Note that the primary rationale for the base is to support the American alliance.  
The role the base can play in regional security is presented as a secondary benefit of the base.   
Following this pattern, US military presence is steadily increasing. As of  2019, 
American stationed 2500 American men and women in 2019 in Australia, and the plan is for the 
US station to grow as agreed upon in 2012.106 Moreover, Australia continues to buy US planes 
and technology increasing its dependence on the US military.107 They are conducting an 
increasing number of military exercises with Australia. In 2005, they began Exercise Talisman 
Saber which has grown since 2010 becoming the largest multilateral drill for Australia to date in 
2015. 108 Australia also joined the American military in exercise with the Philippians in 2014 and 
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with France and the United Kingdom in 2018.109 This build-up sends a message to the United 
States that Australia is committed to fighting with them when the time comes. If the American 
alliance loses its value, Australia will look elsewhere for military assistance as it is currently 
dependent on the United States or limit its military demonstration in the north of the continent to 
minimize Chinese reactions to it.  
Regardless of the extent, the Australian government is under the impression that its 
American alliance is key to its security as a nation. So, irrespective of the potential economic 
consequences, Australia will continue to balance against China in the region to show good faith 
toward the United States if the public recognizes the threat posed by China or the value of the US 
alliance.  
 
Theoretical Explanation:  
I recognize that this case involves the most substantial threat to Australian security, and 
some will see it as less burden-sharing with the United States effort and more of an issue of a 
genuine threat to Australian national security. Chinese expansion is a threat to Australia as it 
grows more aggressive in its government interference and threaten regional stability.110 The fact 
that China is a threat motivates Australia to protect itself; however, the high value of the 
American alliance motivates Australia to protect itself through burden-sharing. In this instance, 
Australia is sharing the burden of balancing China with the United States, Japan, and others. This 
balancing is imperative to its long-term survival in the region. The burden-sharing specifically 
with the United States is happening because of the government's understanding that its American 
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alliance will keep them afloat in the face of this threat and future ones. Arguably, if Australia 
chose to distance itself from the United States the reactions from the Chinese could be lesser as 
the United States is also China's number one opponent on the world stage.  
Australia had options in how it would react to the threat and the fact that it chose a costly 
option in siding with the United States speaks to the role of alliance valuation.  New Zealand, a 
comparable country to Australia with fewer military linkages to Washington, remained neutral 
on the issue to stay in the good graces of the Chinese and the Americans.111 This was a practical 
path for the Australians as well. In 2018, both Australia and New Zealand decided to ban 
Huawei, a Chinese telecom company, from installing 5G networks in their countries.112 Each 
country's framing of the issue called for different reactions from the Chinese. New Zealand 
dubbed the decision "country-agnostic" and as a result, China had no noticeable reaction. 
However, Australia justified its decision based on national security concerns, and in reaction, 
China banned the import of Australian coal.113 The Australian intelligence network that led the 
public charge against Huawei hurt its economic relationship with China. The potential reactions 
of the Chinese to the balancing steps that Australia is making could cripple the Australian 
economy. China cannot afford to stop buying Australian iron ore, but it can sanction other 
Australian goods which would quickly become costly for the Australians.114 Despite this 
Australia continues to speak out against China on issues like its poor treatment of citizens of 
Hong Kong, increased tensions with Taiwan and any other issue that the United States also felt 
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strongly about.115 Each of which ricks increased backlash from China. Had the Australians 
prioritized its economic balance and short-term security it may be more cautious in its balancing 
efforts, like New Zealand. However, its decision to assertively act against China pushed them 
closer to the United States creating yet another opportunity to improve the alliance. Each time 
China reacts to Australian moves, Canberra gets slightly more dependent on Washington. We 
know this is the rationale from assessing the priorities of the government at the time.  
 In the 2020 strategic update to the Australian 2016 White Paper, Australia repeatedly 
commits to the United States both in general terms and in reaction to the China situation. The 
paper states, “Defense will continue to strengthen its engagement with Australia’s international 
partners in support of shared regional security interests and will continue to deepen Australia’s 
alliance with the United States.” 116 This demonstrates that one of the country's main objectives 
to increase and maintain its American alliance. In the following pages, the government continues 
to credit the United States with the stability of the region and asserts Australia's support for 
American involvement.117 Reiterating that its decision to address the issue in conjunction with 
the United States instead of parallel to it because of how important the United States is to the 
country. 
 Australia’s commitment to the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Alliance, or the Quad, is 
also evidence that the alliance with the United States motivates its decision-making process. The 
Quad is an alliance between Australia, America, India, and Japan in their efforts to balance 
China. The powers created it in reaction to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami as a relief effort and 
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molded into an informal alliance by 2007.118 In the years since creation the informal alliance 
faded and in 2017 Japan and the United States began their attempts at revitalizing the alliance to 
balance China and remove them as the primary threat to regional stability. During this time there 
were major concerns that the United States was an unreliable ally from India and Japan.119 It was 
concerned that being part of an alliance that is a blatant balancing coalition that would threaten 
China. Despite this concern, Australia has focused on the benefits is increasing the links that 
Washington has to the Indo-Pacific region, which was especially important as the major ally was 
extremely unpredictable at that time when Japan and India were not always so hopeful.120 
Australia did not leave the United States behind when it was unpredictable because as the value 
of the American alliance was still high even if it need to be reassured through another 
commitment like the Quad. 
 Australia’s high level of commitment to the United States also comes with concern that 
the United States will abandon them in its time of need.121 As Snyder points out, higher 
dependence means a higher willingness to be entrapped.122 Consequently, upon the US’ request 
Australia and Japan began working on improving their interconnectedness. Their increased 
interaction is a direct result of the United States asking for the "spikes" of its Pacific network to 
connect.123 The two hoped their compliance with the requests of the United States would invite 
Washington to increase its involvement in the area.124 In 2016, the Australians and the Japanese 
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attempted to prove their commitment to the United States through tri-lateral security talks on the 
issue of China expansion.125 The Australians and Japanese steadily built a relationship as the two 
nations grow closer to the United States and more dependent on its military for protection. The 
efforts on behalf of the Japanese and Australians here show that when their major ally makes a 
request, it will increase its burden-sharing effort to contest Chinese expansion together.  
 If Australia were just addressing threat, it would likely be building up as many alliances 
as it can in the region. However, the only major efforts made to balance have been with the 
United States, or under the direction of the United States. This continues as Australia signed a 
$580 million deal with Washington to improve the four northern bases and increase 
wargaming,126 while still making minimal connections with other allies. At the peak of American 
unreliability Australia was still hesitate to make agreements with other powers.  
 This case exemplifies the importance of balancing fear of abandonment as well. Just after 
the 2016 security talks with the United States, the Donald Trump won the US election and allies 
began to question the foreign policy commitments of the United States. The new administration 
presented the United States as an unreliable ally and as a direct result South Korea and Japan 
both took part in security talks with China in 2018. The alliance value of the United States had 
diminished as Japan and South Korea did not believe the United States was willing to ensure 
their security and Japan and South Korea needed to look for a new major power ally.127 Then, in 
March of 2021, with the Biden administration in power the earlier foreign policy commitments 
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of the United States to restored and Washington reaffirmed their committed to these two 
nations.128  
Australia never truly considered siding with China and this could result from the similar 
western cultures between the United States and Australia. Their aligned particular interests 
upkept the alliance value, so it did not drop as low in Japan and South Korea which have 
different cultural values. There is an ideal amount of doubt for countries to have in its alliance 
with Washington, however too much doubt and allies can turn to adversaries.  
 This theory also functions on the basis that the public must either appreciate the 
importance of the American alliance or the threat of Chinese expansion. The Lowy Institute 
completes surveys each year on various issues including Australian public opinion on China. 
These polls show us that public opinion sees both the importance of the American alliance and 
mistrusts the Chinese. First, a Lowy poll completed on the importance of the US alliance in 2020 
showed that 71% of Australians viewed its alliance with the United States as important to 
Australian security. And overall, 43% view the American alliance as “very important.”129 This 
poll also shows that the percent of Australians that highly value the alliance has remained over 
70% since 2008 and above 50% since before 2005. Also, in a 2019 poll on superpower relations, 
50% of Australians believed that the Australian government should put America as a higher 
priority despite potential harm to the Chinese alliance while only 44% voted for the inverse.130 
The people recognize the value of their alliance with the United States.  
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The Australians are not as decisive on what types of military actions should be allowed 
under the ANZUS treaty the people showed that as of 2020, 63% of Australians did not believe 
that it should join in military efforts in Asia for the sake of the US security alliance.131 This 
shows that the public’s willingness to fight for the alliance is limited; but it is not preventative. 
The Lowy Institute's poll shows that as of 2020, views of China as more of an economic partner 
than an adversary are still the majority but the group that sees China as a threat is steadily 
growing.132 12% of the population saw China as more of a threat in 2018 but in 2020, 41% of the 
population believes that. Another poll from the Pew Research center on countries' trust in China 
demonstrates this same pattern and concluded that in 2020, 81% of Australians view China 
unfavorably.133  
The uptick in the number of people that view China has threatening has been a result of 
Canberra publicizing Chinese cyberattacks on Australian soil and a public backlash to 
communist bribery in Australia.134 While the public recognition of the threat is new, the 
understanding of the importance of the American alliance is established and satisfied the 
condition for burden-sharing before threat was recognized. In conclusion, the Australian public 
both values the American alliance and sees a threat from the Chinese expansion; therefore, 
eliminating any hurdle the government may encounter in its effort to burden share with the 
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United States. Therefore, the Australian government will continue to burden share until public 
opinion changes, or the government’s opinion on the American alliance changes. 
The Australian government and people both see China as a threat to its well-being 
because of its disregard for the rules of the international system and increasing aggression in the 
region. Therefore, it will work to balance the growing Chinese power. The government then had 
to decide how the Australians would fend off Chinese influence in the region. Because of its high 
valuation of the US alliance, this was seen as another opportunity to show the Washington that 
Canberra has and will continue to side with the United States when the United States needs them.  
  
Alternative Explanation: 
Another explanation for why Australia chose this path of burden-sharing may be that it is 
protecting the identity and values that benefit it. The ideological difference between the Chinese 
and the Australians are numerous and, as seen in the Vietnam case, the Australian people 
strongly identify with its western peers instead of its regional neighbors.135 Therefore with the 
rise of China, Canberra may feel as though its identity and the liberal world order are threatened. 
Malcolm Turnbull told China, in a now-famous radio interview for a Sydney radio station 2GB, 
"We are an open-trading nation, mate, but I'm never going to trade our values in response to 
coercion from wherever it comes."136 Australia is protecting its values, and, in many ways, those 
values are that of liberal world order.  
Additionally, Erika Pollmann et al. (2015) writes on the topic of the burgeoning 
relationship between Australia and Japan as a result of them both aligning with the United States 
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against China. She makes a point to emphasize, “While being solidly grounded in such mundane 
concerns, USA–Australia– Japan cooperation is also unique and transcendent from a ‘realist’ 
perspective because it is deliberately being constructed based on a common liberal democratic 
identity and underpinned by shared values.”137 This is strong support for the idea that Australia is 
protecting its identity and the world order. However, it may be that identity which makes the, a 
target. Australia, Japan, and other allies in the region that are helping to balance with the United 
States are adversaries of China because its ideals do not align with China. China is not targeting 
other communist nations that it can already manipulate. Instead, the coalition created against 
China is all liberal democracy as those are the nations that are targeted.  
While the argument for this alternative is strong at face value, the states fighting for the 
liberal international order have all violated it in recent history.138  Chengxin Pan reminds 
onlookers that Japan is continuing to ignore international criminal court rulings on fishing laws, 
Australia is critiqued for its poor treatment of asylum seekers, and the United States is enforcing 
the UN Laws of the Sea which it has not signed onto itself.139 Pan puts it best as he writes, 
“…defending the rules-based international order is more likely a disguise for the Quad countries 
to constrain China’s rise and maintain a balance of power in its favour.”140 Once again we see 
government reframing situations to increase the public backing for it, just as we did with 
Vietnam and Iraq.  
This justification also does not explain why Australia did not move away from the United 
States when other states did. Japan and India both benefit from liberal international order and 
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began to look balance China in different ways when the United States was not seen as 
particularly reliable. On the other hand, the high alliance valuation that pushed Australia to react 
to the threat of China by burden-sharing with the United States does explain the loyalty of 
Australia. Protecting national security can appear as them protecting its ideology, but the means 
used show that the alliance with the United States decided how it would be protecting 
themselves.  
 In conclusion, while protecting its identity was important to the Australians, it had a host 
of Western nations to balance with that could have minimized the Chinese response to its 
balancing. The importance of the US alliance to the Australian government pushed them to 
specifically side with the US, align with nations that also had close relationships with the United 
States, and increase its dependence on the American military despite Chinese reactionary 
sanctions to such decisions. In the end, the Australians balanced against the Chinese to protect its 
sovereignty; and it did so with the United States because showing commitment to that alliance 




Conclusion and Prescriptions 
           Australia proves that it will burden share with its major power allies when the alliance is 
highly valued by the government and domestic public opinion shares that evaluation of the major 
power alliance or perceives a national security threat. The strength of the cases, with the 
literature, suggests this theory can be generalized to secondary allies like Australia that ialso 
have a fear of abandonment from the major power. Since World War II, Australia burden shared 
in conflict with the United States because of the importance of the alliance to its longevity. The 
government highly valuing the American alliance and understanding the gravity of losing it drew 
them into the conflicts with Vietnam, Iraq, and China alongside the US. In a liberal democracy, 
such as Australia, the public must also be on board with burden-sharing. I argue that the public 
must meet at least one of the two following conditions. The public either highly values the 
American alliance or recognizes a national security threat posed by the adversary in the conflict.  
This was first demonstrated in the case study of Vietnam. The Australian Prime Minister, 
Robert Menzies', decision to involve the country in the conflict in Vietnam was the result of 
moving away from reliance on the United Nations. The Australians needed a new protector, and 
they chose the United States as its candidate. Menzies just needed to ensure that the Australian 
public would not oust him for his decision. The Australian people were seeing the United States 
in a more favorable light when the war began, and they also felt the pressure of the encroaching 
threat of communists. Therefore, when allowed to prove their dedication, the Australian 
government displayed its commitment to its new ally by contributing to the Vietnam war. It went 
to war for the alliance. 
           Again, in Iraq, when some of America’s major allies decided that war was a waste of 
resources the Australians noticed an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to the United States. The 
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, eloquently wove the importance of increasing military 
ties with the United States into every speech as he worked to convince his colleagues and 
constituents its participation in Iraq was vital. His speeches also exaggerated the potential 
presence of weapons of mass destruction which pushed the public in favor of assistance. As a 
result, the Australian people did not stand in the government’s way of joining the American war 
effort.   
           The pattern continues through today as Canberra continues to tackle Chinese expansion 
with the United States; instead of remaining a relatively neutral entity between the largest 
military ally on one side and largest economically on the other, as New Zealand did; or confide 
in any alliance other than the number one adversary of China to address the issue.  Alternatively, 
Canberra gradually moved closer to Washington, increased its military commitment to the US, 
and committed to another alliance agreements. The Australian people supported these decisions 
as they have an established understanding of the importance of the US alliance and the 
emergence of the perceived threat from China increased support. The move to side with the 
United States resulted in economic sanctions from the Chinese but also increased the chances 
that its American ally will stay in the region to fight as tensions increase. Australia continues to 
show its loyalty to the American alliance through burden-sharing because it is dependent on US 
security and fears that without consistent reassurance of its commitment the United States will 
abandon them.   
           Each of these cases shows that Australia, a secondary ally, consistently burden shares with 
the United States to remain in its favor because that alliance is so valuable and public opinion is 
not preventative. The alternative states that Australia, and other secondary allies, may get 
involved to protect its identity and a world order that benefits them, often established by that 
major power ally. However, in the case of Australia, this does not prove to be the case.  
In Vietnam, Australia fought against the idea of communism and that did oppose its 
capitalist western identity. However, it chose to fight with Americans in Vietnam which needed 
men and money, while the British were also addressing the issue in a more diplomatic manner 
that was less costly. The decision to side with the United States was because the Australian 
government knew the US alliance would benefit them more. In Iraq, the war was presented to the 
people as us versus them war over ideology. PM Howard called on the Australian people to fight 
for the freedoms of all people. However, his actions did not follow that line of thinking. Howard 
said what he thought would get the public on his side, even if he did not believe it. The Chinese 
expansion threatens Australia’s western societal foundations and the rules-based order that 
stabilizes the region. However, Canberra also tests the boundaries of the rules-based order by 
violating international policy on the treatment of asylum seekers leading the to conclusion that 
the protecting the rules-based order is a cover for protecting its security. In the long term, having 
remained neutral Australia could jeopardize its future alliance with the United States.  
Like Australia, all other secondary allies need security and support from major powers 
like the United States. Therefore, when the state that ensures its security requests assistance those 
secondary allies will almost always respond. It will not response if the public does not recognize 
either a threat to national security or the importance of the American alliance. If not, that state’s 
protections under the major ally are at risk of decreasing. This research undertook a variety of 
cases but focused on one ally and so can only be generalized for the group of allies, like 
Australia, which have similar relationships with the United States in that it fears abandonment in 
the face of a new threat. These countries potentially include Poland, Japan, and South Korea. 
Future studies should test the necessity for the fear of abandonment to be present of this theory to 
hold up. Research should also look at countries, such as North Korea, that appear to be burden-
sharing with China instead to see how different major powers affect this theory.   
This pattern is important to recognize as China’s growth moves the world closer to a 
bipolar system. The United States must continue to balance against the growing giant and that 
will be impossible without allies. The US government must understand how to ensure allies will 
burden share to prevent the United States from having to protect the liberal world order and 
democracy on its own. Countries like Australia and Japan, which never were America’s number 
one or two priorities, are the countries that will decide where the balance falls on this issue.  
The case of balancing Chinese expansion shows that the perception of the United States 
can threaten the valuation of our alliance in the eyes of allies. The Australians were warned that 
with Donald Trump as the president of the United States would become less reliable as an ally 
which inherently decreased that alliance value. And so, it should maintain its middle position and 
act as a common ally for both the United States and China.141 While Canberra did not heed this 
advice, other countries did as Japan and South Korea entertained security talks with China. The 
United States needs to prevent this and restore the faith others have in their commitments. 
America must show that it values secondary allies and America will show up for them if it shows 
up for us.  
This study showed that if America wants allies to come to our aid in future conflicts, then 
the United States must reassure its allies' governments and populations that US security 
commitments are reliable, and that America is an important ally to have. In the situation with 
Australia a little doubt is constant because of geography, and with most secondary allies the 
unknown number of priorities America puts before them creates sufficient doubt. There must a 
balance as with too much doubt these middle powers look elsewhere for protection like Australia 
moved away from Britain during the Cold War.  
 This reestablishment of the United States as a reliable and important ally requires the 
Washington to resume its deep engagement in international affairs. The United States' 
establishment of close military relations with Australia during peacetime allowed us to foster the 
relationship that causes them to intervene when conflict arose. This is an arrangement that is 
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easily mimicked in other nations. The United States upkeeps bases all over the world and each 
country that with a base supports a relationship with America. The continuation of military 
exercise with allies increases these connections as well. 
 Also, in Vietnam, the United States gained the alliance of the Australians over Britain 
because it was seen as having a greater ability to protect. Again, in the warning for Chinese 
expansion, experts warn that the United States may not be willing and able to protect the 
Australian forces. To foster its major power status, it must fortify its identity as the strongest 
power. Whether this is through power projecting military practices or actual military action, the 
United States must prove that its military is still the strongest in the world.  
Alliance valuation appears to be dependent on the secondary ally’s belief that the power 
can protect them and is increased by the perceived reliability of the major power to follow 
through. In the Iraq case, Howard emphasizes the influence of the United States in maintaining 
stability in the Pacific as a reason that it is important. America proved that the region was one 
that America would protect. If that erodes, the United States cannot expect allies to continue to 
value the alliance. America must walk back its "America First" rhetoric that threatened to 
abandon American allies because it increases doubt to a dangerous level and pushed allies to 
look toward other powers for aid. This is clearly seen through the rising influence of Russia in 
the European Union.  
More work should be done on what causes a country to be viewed as a valuable ally. 
Above, I have referenced the justifications given by leaders, but those words do not always 
follow reality. Additionally, we must find what causes the balance of productive fear of 
abandonment to tip and make an adversary out of an ally. This research will allow states to 
understand what it must do to gain and maintain allies that will fight with them. Overall, the 
literature on burden-sharing is extensive but far from complete. Those before me researched a 
long list of conflicts and a longer list of countries. We do recognize the importance of the 
interconnections of internal and external elements but refining the theory down to the reality of 
the relationship can only be done through more study. Furthermore, there will be pitfalls to any 
study of burden-sharing as long as country motives must be deciphered.  
The studies of what causes burden-sharing will help the United States to remain a 
hegemon through the return of major power conflict. As China rises and Russia continues to 
become more aggressive Washington needs to ensure that its allies that it is still the best option. 
The wider the reach of the United States the greater the chance that it will emerge once again as 
a unipole. If these conflicts occur through proxy wars, as the Cold War did, allies willing to 
engage simply for the sake of the alliance will be vital. Therefore, those bases must be 
maintained, the military exercises must continue, and Washington must represent itself as an 
undefeatable power.  
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